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SESSION 9

EMERGING POLICY AND PRACTICE ISSUES
Steven L. Schooner
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law
Neal Couture
Director of Government Procurement Law and Business Programs
The George Washington University

I. A HAZY PICTURE ON PROCUREMENT SPENDING: AT THE BOTTOM (YET)?
A. The Decrease Slows. Although federal procurement spending decreased again last year, the
amount of the decrease, less than two percent – felt much less painful than the more daunting drops
in FY 2014 (closer to four percent) and FY 2013 (that was the big drop, at just over ten percent).
Of course, the cumulative decrease is far more acute in certain sectors, but the big picture was less
daunting than it’s been in the prior three years. If the downward trend feels increasingly familiar,
it should, with this being the seventh year of the federal procurement spending decline following the
weirdly stable 2008-2011 plateau.
B. Running the Numbers, Finding the Bottom (Below $500 Billion)? Regular attendees of
this conference are familiar with this chapter’s coverage of the post-millennium federal procurement
spending trend. The post-millennial binge (before the 2008 economic crisis) was significant not only
for its longevity but for its size. To review, in Fiscal Year 2001, federal procurement spending rose to
just over $223 billion. The following years, in 2002 and 2003, we witnessed 18 and 20 percent spending
increases. After steady increases in the middle of the decade, we reached an unprecedented plateau
where federal procurement spending stabilized at approximately $540 billion from Fiscal Years 2008
through 2011. In 2009, we experienced the first decrease in federal procurement spending for well over
a decade, but the decreases were statistically insignificant (and it took a number of years for the data
to catch up). Indeed, much of the post-2008 panic seemed either premature or an over-reaction, as,
for a number of years, the only macro-level spending effect was an absence of growth or expansion.
After the first statistically significant decrease in federal spending, in 2012, we finally experienced
the first dramatic decline in spending and a plunge below the (oh-so-dramatic) $500 billion threshold
in 2013. Whether or not we’ve struck bottom, prospects for expansion appear limited, and nothing
suggests that the market will again flirt with the $500 billion threshold anytime soon.
Using adjusted figures (yes, between the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) and USASpending.gov, history is consistently being re-written), it appears that the annual increases in federal
procurement were most dramatic from 2001 through 2008, cumulatively averaging more than three
times the rate of inflation. The experts correctly predicted that the growth rate eventually would
taper. In 2009, the rate slowed and, apparently, growth finally stalled. Yet, as discussed in past years,
despite the dire warnings, the market contraction unfolded far more slowly than anyone expected.
The chart below summarizes this post-millenial procurement spending cycle. Time will tell how
far the reductions will go and whether they can be sustained. As of last year, however, this chapter
took a broader view of the spending picture to redefine the pie by including grant spending. In that
context, the bad news can be tempered or, in other words, the overall spending decrease appears less
dramatic.
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Federal Procurement and Grant Spending
2001–2015*
Fiscal
Year

Procurement Spending
(in Billions of $)

Grant Spending
(in Billions of $)

Procurement & Grant Spending
(Combined, in Billions of $)

2015

$437.4*

$609.1

$1,046.5

2014

$445.6

$603.9

$1,049.5

2013

$463.3

$523.4

$986.7

2012

$519.3

$544.2

$1,063.5

2011

$540.0

$571.6

$1,111.6

2010

$540.1

$623.2

$1,163.2

2009

$540.7

$675.6

$1,216.3

2008

$541.2

$420.6

$961.8

2007

$469.3

$430.2

$899.5

2006

$430.5

$490.0

$920.5

2005

$391.2

$441.7

$832.9

2004

$346.1

$450.1

$796.2

2003

$318.0

$493.7

$811.7

2002

$264.1

$406.3

$670.4

2001

$223.0

$330.8

$553.8

*FY 2015 figures reflect an estimate based upon preliminary reporting.
See www.USASpending.gov.
The total procurement spending amounts reported above, for every year, 2009-2014, changed
significantly compared to last year’s USASpending reports. Changes to prior years tend to be
less statistically significant.

C. Comparing (and Combining?) Contracts and Grants. As discussed previously, contracting experts increasingly assert that less and less
distinguishes a government contract from a federal grant. Many contractors also compete for and receive grants. Consistent with the trend this
chapter has reported, grant spending exceeded procurement spending last
year, as it has for thirteen of the last fifteen years. Moreover, while grant
spending fell after peaking in FY2010, grants – unlike contracts – never
fell below the $500 billion threshold and now, again, have crossed the $600
billion threshold. Moreover, the grant decline only lasted four years before
climbing again, and the FY2014 increase was significant. And, of course,
the government appears to be investing additional resources in revamping
the regulatory regime that applies to grants. See, generally, 2 C.F.R. 200.
D. Data Quality. As noted above, the FPDS data is constantly being updated, supplemented, changed, and, presumably, corrected. And
ongoing analysis continues to cast doubt on these figures. But they still
represent the most useful data set accessible in the public domain. CRS
Surveys DOD Contract Obligations, FPDS Reliability, 57 GC ¶ 144 (“[T]
he Government Accountability Office ‘has repeatedly raised concerns
over the accuracy, limitations, and reliability of the data contained in
the FPDS-NG database.’ See 54 GC ¶ 124; 55 GC ¶ 180; 56 GC ¶ 263.
‘Despite the limitations of FPDS, imperfect data are sometimes better
than no data’ … [and, i]f Congress and policymakers understand the
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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limitations, ‘FPDS data can be used to identify some broad trends and
rough estimations, or to gather information about specific contracts.’”).
Quite simply, generating accurate data is difficult. DPAP, DCMA Need To
Improve Cost Analysis Oversight And Documentation, 57 GC ¶ 347 (DoD
IG asserts that “DCMA still cannot reliably report on the number of cost
analysis cases performed, the dollar value of contractor proposals analyzed, and the questioned costs reported[.]”). On a related note, see GSA
Transactional Data Collection Would Create Compliance Burden, Industry
Group Says, 57 GC ¶ 167 (“GSA significantly underestimates the costs
of modifying information systems and data quality control that Federal
Supply Schedule vendors would incur under ... GSA[’s] proposed a pilot
program to require reporting of transactional data – such as unit prices,
quantities sold, manufacturers and part numbers – from holders of FSS
contracts, other Government-wide acquisition contracts[,] and indefinitedelivery, indefinite-quantity contracts.”); GSA Grossly Underestimates FSS
Transactional Data Reporting Burden, ABA Section Warns, 57 GC ¶ 160;
GSA Proposes Collecting Transactional Pricing Data, Phasing Out FSS
Price Reductions Clause, 57 GC ¶ 79, 80 Fed. Reg. 11619 (March 4, 2015).
E. A Year Without Sequestration. Fortunately, despite some last
minute drama, the dramatic disruption of sequestration was not repeated
in 2015. That should not suggest a bright future for the kind of stable
funding that facilitates efficient, long-term investment decisions. In what
can only be described as a strange election cycle, budgeting is difficult to
handicap. Fortunately, there appears to be bipartisan distaste for another
shutdown, which should contribute to some amount of short-term budget
stability, which is better than nothing.
II. 2015 HIGHLIGHT: THE USD(AT&L) LPTA MEMORANDUM
On March 4, 2015, USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall issued an important
memorandum to the defense community: Appropriate Use of Lowest Priced
Technically Acceptable Source Selection Process and Associated Contract
Type. The memorandum is short (only three pages, nine substantive paragraphs), but it offers clear, direct guidance intended to rein in the (real or
perceived) over-reliance on Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable (LPTA)
procurement. We have recommended it to students as an excellent example
of clear, persuasive, and efficient writing, and we hope that it is widely
circulated and considered. Among other things, the memo explains that:
•

“LPTA is the appropriate source selection process to apply only
when there are well-defined requirements, the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, price is a significant
factor in the source selection, and there is neither value, need,
nor willingness to pay for higher performance.”

•

“LPTA has a clear, but limited place in the source selection
‘best value’ continuum…. [and improper reliance on LPTA can
cause DoD to] miss an opportunity to secure an innovative, costeffective solution to meet Warfighter needs to help maintain
[DoD’s] technological advantage.”

•

The selection of solicitation and contract type is also important,
particularly with regard to services. While fixed-price contracts
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are appropriate where DoD’s “requirements are firm, easily
understood, and tied to clear, measureable outcomes,” they too,
should only be used where appropriate. Where DoD “cannot
firmly predict the tasks, efforts, and required outcomes that
the contractor will be expected to perform,” other contracting
types – including cost-reimbursement contracts and time-andmaterials (T&M) contracts – make more sense.
We hope that this memorandum enjoys wide distribution and that it proves
more effective in changing risk averse acquisition workforce behavior
than OFPP’s well-intentioned, but, in retrospect, apparently ineffective,
myth-busters campaign.
III. TECHNOLOGY: THE RE-DESIGN OF ACQUISITION.GOV
As we expect you’ve noticed by now, GSA has redesigned and relaunched Acquisition.gov. The site is visually pleasing, but, we have
some concerns as to the priority given to appearance as opposed to user
friendliness and utility. Indeed, we are reminded that USASpending.gov
was created as a mirror image site of a non-government initiative undertaken because the public was frustrated with its inability to access and
manipulate data found in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).
•

We’re curious to know how the user community (in the broadest sense) perceives the FAR Part Index on the new FAR site,
https://www.acquisition.gov/?q=browsefar.

•

To the extent that we now take for granted that the online version of the FAR is the official version (rather than running to
the library to check Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations),
we’re increasingly disappointed that, as 2016 approaches, and
our mobile phones and tablets contain apps that solve a mindboggling array of previously intractable problems, no one in the
Government seems inclined to provide some of the most basic
services sought with regard to the FAR System. We hope that
future redesigns will attempt to address, at a minimum:
- A single function that displayed, overlaid, and reconciled the
FAR and all appropriate agency regulations. In other words,
for a hypothetical Army contracting action, the electronic resource would display the relevant FAR, DFARS, and AFARS
regulations as a single document, with visual cues (whether
font or color) to distinguish the various tiers of regulations.
The standardized FAR numbering regime, dating back to
its promulgation in 1984, anticipated the utility of such a
function.
- A working archival function that displayed the FAR (and
if possible, the appropriate agency regulations, as noted
above) at a given date. Working through arbitrarily dated
Federal Acquisition Circulars (FAC’s) is confusing enough,
but the benefits of the online FAR – for example, the direct
links within the regulation, to provisions and clauses, and
to statutes – are lost when attempting to work with prior
versions.

© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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•

We’re also curious to know whether government employees
are using the Acquisition Gateway, https://www.acquisition.
gov/acquisition_gateway. [GSA explains that: “The Acquisition
Gateway, built by GSA, helps federal government buyers from
all agencies act as one acquisition community. The Acquisition
Gateway is a workspace that provides accurate, useful, and
unbiased advice. It helps federal acquisition professionals learn
what they need to know, connect with others to collaborate and
communicate, and act to accomplish their tasks effectively.”]

IV. OFPP, GOVERNMENT-WIDE POLICY, INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY, CATEGORY MANAGEMENT, AND …
SMALL BUSINESS?
A. Information Technology on GAO’s High Risk List. In the calendar year following the high profile (and, at times, problematic) rollout of
the new HeathCare.com web site, GAO added information technology (IT)
to its high-profile High Risk List, http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/overview. (To
be fair, we sense that the new web site was merely the straw that broke the
camel’s back; IT procurement has bedeviled federal acquisition before, and
will continue to do so in the future.) GAO Adds IT Acquisition Management
To High-Risk List, 57 GC ¶ 46 (GAO found that “federal IT investments too
frequently fail to be completed or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes.” Moreover, “the
Government has ‘spent billions of dollars on failed and poorly performing
IT investments which often suffered from ineffective management, such
as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and
governance.’” GAO chastised the Government for implementing less than
25 percent of GAO’s more than 730 recommendations made over five years –
yes, that’s nearly 150 recommendations per year!); Agencies Need Improved
Strategic Sourcing Of IT Services, 57 GC ¶ 341 (finding that: “DHS, NASA
and the military services ‘have made strides in their efforts to strategically
source IT services, but none have fully incorporated leading commercial
practices.’”); House Subcommittees Eye FITARA Promises, Risks For IT
Acquisition, 57 GC ¶ 181 (“FITARA[‘s] ....success depends on agencies’
implementation....”); CRS: Agencies Moving Slowly To Cloud Computing, 57
GC ¶ 32 (Migration to the cloud has been “impeded by federal security requirements, barriers imposed by agency culture, new network infrastructure
requirements, the need for appropriate acquisition workforce expertise[,]
… funding concerns…, the Government’s lengthy review processes[,] and
… stringent privacy and reliability requirements….”).
B. Laptop and Desktop Purchasing. Given the range of issues available, OFPP has an aggressive agenda. OFPP Head Updates Acquisition
Reform Plan, 57 GC ¶ 85 (“Progress has been made in bringing greater innovation into the acquisition system.”); OFPP Launches ‘Acquisition 360’ IT
Vendor Survey, 57 GC ¶ 90 (“Rung described Acquisition 360 as ‘the first ever
transaction-based feedback tool that allows agencies to identify strengths and
weaknesses in their acquisition processes with the focus on pre-award activities, contract execution, and certain post award activities, such as debriefings.’”
). One of the most concrete initiatives, however, deals with IT hardware. Last
year, we discussed that one of Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
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Administrator Anne Rung’s priorities was category management. Early on,
she explained that “There is a critical need for a new paradigm for purchasing
that moves from managing purchases and price individually across thousands
of procurement units to managing entire categories of common spend and
total cost through category management … [so] that agencies get the same
competitive price and quality of performance when they are buying similar
commodities under similar circumstances[.]” OFPP now hopes standardize – and, to some extent, centralize – the purchase of laptop and desktop
computers. Anne Rung, OMB Memo M-16-02, Category Management Policy
15-1: Improving the Acquisition and Management of Common Information
Technology: Laptops and Desktops (October 16, 2015), available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-16-02.pdf.
Among other things, the ambitious memorandum explains that:
• The Federal Government spends over $50 billion a year on
hardware, software, telecommunications, IT security, and IT
professional services through tens of thousands of contracts and
delivery orders…. However, many agencies continue to buy and
manage their IT in a fragmented and inefficient manner, in a
large part due to the highly decentralized structure of major
cabinet level departments, which conflicts with the goals of
… FITARA and with the principles of category management
outlined … by [OFPP].
• In FY 2014, agencies awarded more than 10,000 contracts and
delivery orders for common laptops and desktops totaling about
$1.1 billion [frankly, we were expecting a much higher number],
resulting in reduced buying power, inefficient duplication of
contracts, and very little transparency into prices paid. Instead
of … banding together as the world’s largest buyer to negotiate
better prices and terms, too often [the Government] buys like
thousands of small businesses, makings smaller awards for
the same IT products across multiple agencies, and sometimes
within a single organization.

• [Accordingly,] OMB has determined that agencies must take
immediate steps [including]:
- standardize laptop and desktop configurations for common
requirements;
- reduce the number of contracts for laptops and desktops by
consolidating purchasing and using a fewer number of highperforming - or best-in-class- contracts; and
- develop and modify demand management processes to
optimize price and performance.

• [E]ffective immediately [with certain exceptions], agencies
are prohibited from issuing new solicitations for laptops and
desktops, and civilian agencies shall leverage the following
existing vehicles …: NASA Solutions for Enterprise-Wide
Procurement (SEWP), General Services Administration (GSA)
IT Schedule 708, or Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), National Institutes of Health (NIH), NITAAC Chief
Information Officer-Commodities and Solutions (CIO-CS)[.]
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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• [Saving money, exploiting economies of scale, appears to be
a priority.] Agencies should focus the bulk of their acquisition of
laptops and desktops on publicized buying events to maximize
the Government’s collective buying power.

• [A new reporting requirement has been generated, in that]
effective immediately, CIOs shall ensure that at least 80% of
their agency’s new basic laptop and desktop requirements are
satisfied with one of these standard configurations, unless an
exception is consistent with an approved IT acquisition strategy
or plan, as required by OMB’s FITARA implementation guidance,
and approved in writing by the agency CIO. … [T]ransition plans
are due by February 28, 2016, and will be collected through the
Integrated Data Collection managed by OMB’s Office of the
Federal Chief Information Officer.

• Agencies shall develop and implement [refreshment] policies
and procedures…. Generally, agency CIOs shall adopt a uniform
refresh cycle, such as replacing 25% of inventory every year for 4
years or 20% of inventory every year for 5 years.

• [N]onetheless, m]aximizing small business utilization is
a key category management principle and an important
component of this policy. ... The percentage of desktop and
laptop work (in dollars) awarded to small businesses in FY 2014
under the three vehicles described above was 64%, or nearly 10
percent greater than the small business participation rate for
these commodities overall, and nearly 85% of the vendors on
these solutions are small businesses.

We look forward to seeing how this plays out.
C. Another Busy Year In Small Business. Last year, the small
business community was abuzz over was the unusual achievement of the
Congressionally-mandated twenty-three percent goal for small business
participation. Given how rarely the government had achieved the statutory goal, the benchmark drew more attention than the reality: that an
increasingly diverse pool of small businesses were competing for – at least
temporarily – a larger percentage of a steadily shrinking pie.
•

The big winner this year appears to be women-owned small
businesses (WOSB’s), who appear to be gaining some amount
of access to sole source awards, previously the exclusive domain
of the 8(a) community (and, for a turbulent period, Alaska Native
Corporations (ANC’s)). SBA Authorizes WOSB Sole-Source Contracts, 57 GC ¶ 288 (CO’s can now “award sole-source contracts
[up to $6.5 million for manufacturing, up to $4 million for other
contracts] to women-owned small businesses and economically
disadvantaged WOSBs (EDWOSBs) in certain circumstances”);
see also 80 Fed. Reg. 55019 (Sept. 14, 2015), SBA Proposes Rule
To Authorize WOSB Sole-Source Contracts, 57 GC ¶ 152, 80
Fed. Reg. 24846 (May 1, 2015). Granted, the WOSB sole source
authority appears far more limited what the 8(a) firms enjoy –
both in terms of statutory authority and practice. To the extent
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that the rule applies to “eligible … EDWOSBs for certain Federal
contracts or orders in industries in which the Small Business
Administration (SBA) determines that WOSBs are underrepresented in Federal procurement[,]” the rule seems susceptible to
the difficulties that ultimately gutted the small disadvantaged
business (SDB) price preference following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200
(1995). Note that the rule specifies that both “substantial underrepresentation” and “underrepresentation” must be “determined
by a study using a reliable and relevant methodology.”) Stay
tuned also for additional rulemaking on WOSB certification.

© 2016 Thomson Reuters

•

The Veterans Administration’s procurement practices drew
plenty of attention this year. Federal Lawmakers, Veterans Groups
Back Contracting Challenge To VA, 57 GC ¶ 280 (More than 40
members of Congress “filed an amicus brief in support of a contractor suing the Department of Veterans Affairs” in Kingdomware
Techs., Inc. v. U.S., 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also 56 GC ¶
194. The dispute involves the VA’s “discretion to procure services
through the Federal Supply Schedule once it has met its contracting goals for veteran-owned small businesses and service-disabled
VOSBs.” See 57 GC ¶ 200(a). The Supreme Court agreed to hear
the case, later removed it from the argument docket and ordered
supplemental briefing, then re-scheduled the argument for 2016.);
VA Proposes Overhaul Of VOSB Verification Process, 57 GC ¶ 364
(“The proposed rule ... would clarify VOSB eligibility requirements,
revise definitions, reorder requirements and align provisions with
other set-aside programs.”); Bill Introduced To Improve VOSB And
SDVOSB Programs, 57 GC ¶ 363 (legislation would, among other
things, “harmonize the definitions of VOSB and SDVOSB”); House
Panels Probe VA Small Business Goals Reporting, 57 GC ¶ 197
(“Jan Frye, deputy assistant secretary and senior procurement
executive ... charged that VA has circumvented the required FSS
use for billions of dollars worth of medical equipment[.]”).

•

The Congressionally-mandated participation percentages continue to attract legislative attention, dominate agency leadership
priorities and, ultimately consume scarce acquisition personnel
resources. House Panel Surveys WOSB Awards, Small Business
Goals, 57 GC ¶ 368 (highlighting the positive – achieving the
government-wide 23 percent small business contracting goal –
but bemoaning that “the Federal Government excludes nearly
20 percent of its contracts before it figures out whether or not it
met its goals.”); Leadership Attention Needed To Overcome SBA
Management Challenges, GAO Says, 57 GC ¶ 339 (GAO suggests
that: “SBA has [failed to implement] an effective human capital
strategy, … not effectively managed acquisition and information
technology … [and not addressed] deficiencies with SBA oversight
of contracting programs for economically disadvantaged small
businesses.”); Government Exceeds FY 2014 Small Business Goal,
57 GC ¶ 199 (“FY 2014 percentage [24.99 percent] is the highest
since Congress established the 23-percent goal in 1997.”); Advocacy
Group Bemoans Small Business Dollars Going To Large Contrac-
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tors, 57 GC ¶ 156 (Public Citizen suggests that SBA’s “claims of
meeting or nearing the Government’s small business contracting
goals ‘are misleading and rely on methodologies that conflict with
federal law and regulations,’” and that the Government “relies on
methodologies that present a false impression of the percentage
of procurement that small businesses actually receive[.]”)
•

And, of course, plenty of other small business issues remain, from
the adjustment of size standards to stewardship of the mentorprotégé program and the management and enforcement of large
business’ small business subcontracting plans. Comprehensive
Subcontracting Test Program Should Be Made Permanent, GAO
Says, 57 GC ¶ 369; Committee Questions Whether Mentor-Protégé
Benefits Flow To Protégés, 57 GC ¶ 338 (raising “concerns that
mentor-protégé programs have become too focused on providing
incentives to mentors rather than ensuring protégés actually
receive their designated benefits.”); SBA’s FY 2016 Challenges
Include Small Business Contracting Oversight, IG Says, 57 GC
¶ 329 (“the IG’s “top challenge … revolves around weaknesses
in small business contracting programs and inaccurate procurement data[.]”); OFPP Defends Fair Pay And Safe Workplaces EO
Implementation, 57 GC ¶ 300 (Representative Richard Hanna
“lamented the burdens on small businesses imposed by the
administration’s [thirteen executive orders (EO’s)] relating
to Government contracting[.]”); Industry Coalition Suggests
Changes To Proposed Small Business Subcontracting Rule, 57
GC ¶ 263, 80 Fed. Reg. 32909 (June 10, 2015); see also, Industry
Groups Ask White House To Halt Contractor EOs, 57 GC ¶ 256
(“[T]he Professional Services Council, the Aerospace Industries
Association, the National Defense Industrial Association and
the IT Alliance for Public Sector, recently … [sought] a pause in
executive orders that create new compliance requirements for
Government contractors,” suggesting that “these unique and
costly ... regulations simply raise an already substantial barrier
between the commercial and government marketplaces.”); SBA
Should Clarify Proposed Mentor-Protégé Rule Changes, ABA
Section Says, 57 GC ¶ 112; Witnesses Question Proposed Small
Business Size Changes, 57 GC ¶ 180; House Committee Passes
Small Business Contracting Reforms, 57 GC ¶ 103; Reform Small
Business Contracting, Witnesses Urge House Subcommittee, 57
GC ¶ 84 (Reflecting a reduction in overall federal procurement,
it is not surprising that “[a]lthough the percentage of prime
contracts awarded to small businesses is rising, the number
of small business contract actions has fallen nearly 60 percent
– almost 70 percent at [DoD] – and small businesses’ share of
subcontracted work has fallen nearly 2.5 percent”); GAO Flags
Poor SBA Communication With HUBZone Firms, 57 GC ¶ 53
(“GAO found problems stemming from frequent changes to
HUBZone area designations, poor recertification processes, and
inadequate SBA efforts to inform firms about changes affecting
eligibility.”); SBA Should Clarify Proposed Rule On Small Business Contracting, ABA Section Says, 57 GC ¶ 70.
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V.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION: REFORM, REGULATION,
ASSESSMENT, AND THE PURSUIT OF INNOVATION

A. Plenty of Congressional Activity; Assessing Acquisition
Reform: Congress, of course, remains interested in reforming federal
acquisition. Many of the recent legislative reform initiatives will be discussed in other chapters, but the jury remains out as to the impact of the
changes. “[A] flurry of statutory changes and new provisions included in
the FY16 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) … represent the
largest single package of acquisition legislation since the landmark Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. … [But, despite]
calls for extensive changes to acquisition statutes, it is far less clear that
these changes will result in meaningful operational change in the acquisition system....” Andrew Hunter, CSIS 2016 Global Forecast: The Battle
over How to Save Defense Acquisition, available at https://csis.org/files/
publication/151116_Hunter_Defense_Acquisition.pdf. See also Senators,
Witnesses Offer Suggestions For Reducing DOD Overhead Spending, 57 GC
¶ 367 (“[Senator John] McCain noted that DOD currently has about 1.1
million personnel performing ‘overhead activities,’ at a ‘staggering” cost.’)
B. Major Systems: No Shortage of Concerns and Reform Initiatives. See, for example, House Committee Scrutinizes DOD Acquisition Cycle
Times, 57 GC ¶ 337 (GAO observes that “because of competition for limited
funding and a lack of incentives for realistic cost estimates at DOD, a ‘successful’ business case is one that overstates or overpromises performance
and understates cost and understates schedule[.]”); Aircraft Carrier Program
Suffers Poor Outcomes, As Predicted, GAO Says, 57 GC ¶ 310 (GAO warned,
among other things, that: “costs were underestimated and critical technologies were immature; cost “likely will exceed the program’s budget”; “tests
of … key technologies have been deferred by years”; “CVN 78 is unlikely
to achieve promised aircraft launch and recovery rates as key systems are
unreliable”; and “the business case for CVN 79 is also unrealistic[.]”); DOD
Needs To Integrate Enterprise-Level Weapon-Systems Portfolio Reviews, 57
GC ¶ 277 (“DOD’s governance structure includes decision-making processes
and responsibilities that are divided among its stove-piped requirements,
acquisition, and budget communities and focus largely on optimizing individual investments.”); GAO Suggests Better Planning For Air Force Space
Acquisitions, 57 GC ¶ 109 (“The current approach to technology insertion
… is not consistent with the best practice of establishing a plan prior to the
start of a program that identifies specific technologies to be developed and
inserted to achieve a desired end state….”); DOD Needs Better Approach To
Account For ACAT II And III Cost And Performance, 57 GC ¶ 77 (DoD “cannot
provide reliable data on the number, total cost and performance of its current
acquisition category (ACAT) II and III programs [, ...] non-major programs
that range from multi-billion-dollar aircraft-radar modernization programs
to clothing and protective equipment programs valued at tens of millions of
dollars[.]”); CRS Surveys Nunn-McCurdy Act Breaches, 57 GC ¶ 75 (The article
reminds readers that, “[i]n 2011, [CRS’s Moshe] Schwartz testified … that
unrealistic cost estimates, unstable funding, insufficient testing early in the
acquisition process, additional requirements[,] and poor contractor oversight
all contribute to Nunn-McCurdy breaches. If Congress and DOD had known
certain programs’ true costs at the start, ‘different decisions could have been
© 2016 Thomson Reuters

9-10

NOTES
made, and billions of dollars spent on systems that were never fielded or
prematurely cancelled could have been spent on other priorities[.]’ … See 53
GC ¶ 113.); DOD Needs To Streamline Milestone Decision Process For Weapon
Systems, 57 GC ¶ 59 (DoD “should eliminate levels of documentation review
and information requirements that add limited value.... Programs GAO
surveyed took an average of over two years to complete the documentation
of information requirements for their last milestone[.]”)
C. Expectations For Improved Contingency Contracting. Army
Must Improve Oversight Of LOGCAP Task Orders, IG Says, 57 GC ¶ 340
(Among other things, the IG found that: “of the six [contracting officer’s representatives] CORs appointed to the task order…, four had not undergone
required training. …; the procurement CO (PCO) did not develop a quality
assurance surveillance plan …; [and] on at least two of the … sites reviewed,
the contractor began work before the CORs were on site to perform contractor
surveillance.”); SIGAR Envisions Keys To Better Reconstruction Efforts, 57
GC ¶ 286 (suggesting that: “Any future reconstruction effort must start with
a clear, realistic set of objectives, and must use evidence-based policymaking-relying on measurable metrics to determine outcomes ... [and] caution[ing]
against conflating political goals with development objectives[.]”); DOD
Contingency Contracting Problems Persist, IG Finds, 57 GC ¶ 98 (identifying “nine areas with systemic problems include[ing] requirements, contract
pricing, contract type, source selection, oversight and surveillance, financial
management, contractor personnel, contract documentation, and property
accountability....” Moreover: “The effectiveness of contractor support of U.S.
contingency operations could be compromised if DoD officials fail to apply lessons learned from previous problems identified in Iraq and Afghanistan....”);
SPOT Guidance On Overseas Contractor Data Still Needs Improvement, 57
GC ¶ 66 (“DOD does not ensure that SPOT and [Joint Asset Movement Management System] JAMMS ‘provide either contract or contractor personnel
data that are consistently timely and reliable,’ GAO found, cautioning that
‘DOD has incomplete visibility into the number of contractors present in the
contingency environment.’”); SIGAR Finds Wasteful Practices, Poor Planning
For Solid Waste Disposal, 57 GC ¶ 61 (despite having “spent over $81 million
to build 23 solid waste incinerators at nine locations in Afghanistan, … many
incinerators went unused or underused because they were not completed according to contract requirements or were deficient in construction[.]”); DOD
Has Implemented Most SIGAR Recommendations, 57 GC ¶ 27 (“SIGAR made
209 recommendations to DOD [between 2008 and mid-2014 – only three
dozen each year – of which] 161 recommendations, or 77 percent, have been
implemented and closed”).
D. Better Buying Power (BBP) and The Harsh Reality of Technical Superiority, Innovation, and Research and Development. Last
year, we reported that USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s BBP 3.0 had taken
a surprising (and, arguably, disappointing) turn, tilting heavily toward
the micro rather than the macro, increasing the number of bullet points
and reducing the size of the font on the summary Power Point slide. As
a result, the early release of BBP 3.0 felt more like a catch-all or a DoDwide acquisition improvement wish list than an aspirational guidepost.
Few topics disappeared, and many appear to have been added. Seemingly lost in the late-2014 rollout, but re-emphasized in the Spring 2015
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implementation plan, was the theme of “Achieving Dominant Capabilities
through Technical Excellence and Innovation.” See, generally, BBP 3.0
Implementation Directive Released, 57 GC ¶ 120; and discussion of prior
BBP initiatives at 56 GC ¶ 306(c); 54 GC ¶ 358; 52 GC ¶ 312.
1. The Focus on Technical Superiority. The April 9, 2015 Better
Buying Power Fact Sheet explains: “BBP 3.0 focuses attention on the overriding concern that our nation’s technological superiority is at risk.
Our technological superiority is dependent on the effectiveness of our R&D
efforts …. Innovation increasingly comes from the commercial sector and
from overseas.” These sentiments have been broadly echoed. DARPA Technology Transition Needs More Reliable Performance Reporting, 57 GC ¶ 389
(DARPA “does not consistently assess new technology transition outcomes
from research environment to military users … [so] GAO is unable to reliably report on transition performance across DARPA’s portfolio[.]”). As an
aside, we were disappointed to learn of the demise of DARPA and Boston
Dynamics’ robotic animal initiative. See, generally, Keith Wagstaff, Robot
Mule Put Out to Pasture by Marine Corps, NBC News (discussing the LS3
(Legged Squad Support Systems), called everything from a dog to a mule,
which “could run for 24 hours straight on a 20-mile mission across rough
terrain[,]” but proved too loud for its planned mission); ‘Significant Change’
Needed For ‘Significant Challenges’ Facing DOD, Gansler Testifies, 57 GC ¶
389 (former USD(AT&L) Gansler advocated “reversing the congressional
and DOD cuts ‘in the share of the budgets going to R&D’ so that DOD can
‘achieve technological leadership in the 21st century.’); CRS Surveys Administration’s R&D Funding Priorities, 57 GC ¶ 91 (Despite the projected
5.5 percent increase in R&D funding from FY 2015 to 2016, “Congress is
… facing ‘a period of intense pressure on discretionary spending,’ which
will influence the growth rate and the allocation of federal R&D funding.
Further, sequestration and the use of continuing resolutions ‘can affect
agencies’ execution of their R&D budgets, including the delay or cancellation
of planned R&D activities and acquisition of R&D-related equipment,...’”)
Unfortunately, the BBP 3.0 fact sheet has been far less widely distributed than the (extremely dense) Better Buying Power briefing slide.
Moreover, if that indeed is was DoD’s intent, we fear it remains lost in the
implementation and translation. A visit to the Better Buying Power home
page, bbp.dau.mil, and the question: “What Is Better Buying Power?” leads
to the explanation: “AT&L has identified 36 Initiatives grouped under
seven Focus Areas to restore affordability in defense procurement and
improve defense industry productivity.” The seven focus areas include:
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•

Achieve Affordable Programs

•

Control Costs Throughout the Product Lifecycle

•

Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry and Government

•

Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy

•

Promote Effective Competition

•

Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services

•

Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce
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We cannot be the only ones that are struggling to see the pre-eminence
of the pursuit of technical superiority on this list of focus areas. To the
extent that we concede that innovation is part of one of the seven areas
(Incentivize Productivity & Innovation in Industry and Government), it’s
worth looking at the initiatives specified under that focus area:
•

Align profitability more tightly with Department goals

•

Employ appropriate contract types

•

Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate
Initial Production

•

Better define value in “best value” competitions

•

When LPTA is used, define Technically Acceptable to ensure
needed quality

•

Institute a superior supplier incentive program

•

Increase use of Performance-based Logistics

•

Reduce DCAA Audits backlog without compromising effectiveness

•

Expand programs to leverage industry’s IR&D

Indeed, other than leveraging the private sector’s IR&D, it’s unclear
what emphasis, if any, DoD is placing on maintaining technical superiority. That seems like a significant oversight.
2. An Interesting Anecdote on Innovation: Given DoD’s, and,
indeed, the government’s interest in innovation, consider David McCullough’s The Wright Brothers (2015). The book is an entertaining and
informative examination of one of the most iconic and, arguably, significant
moments in paradigm shifting innovation and, more broadly, research and
development. Filled with tidbits about the Wright family and, among other
things, their bicycle business, the book offers bountiful ammunition for
the theory that small businesses (and individuals) – as opposed to large,
sophisticated, bureaucratic businesses and institutions – are the most
fruitful sources of innovation.
•

The Wright Brothers were consistently rebuffed by the
Federal Government (even, apparently, with attempted Congressional intervention) and, accordingly, secured their initial
investment and sales abroad.

•

On both sides of the Atlantic, governments insisted upon flying
prototypes, only investing after extensive, highly public demonstrations. We are not holding our breath on a resurgence in
what we continue to believe is the correct, conservative, and efficient approach, but hope spring eternal. See, by way of contrast,
Boeing, Lockheed Protest Air Force Bomber Award At GAO, 57
GC ¶ 357 (“Boeing and Lockheed [asserted] the Air Force’s cost
evaluation ‘did not properly reward the contractors’ proposals
to break the upward-spiraling historical cost curves of defense
acquisitions, or properly evaluate the relative or comparative
risk of the competitors’ ability to perform, as required by the
solicitation.’”). Of course, plenty of ink also has been spilled with
regard to the evolution of the Joint Strike Fighter. AT&L Praises
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Marine Corps’ F-35B IOC Declaration, 57 GC ¶ 243 (“The Marine Corps’ variant of the JSF, the F-35B Lightning II aircraft,
reached IOC [initial operational capability], with a squadron of
10 F-35Bs based in Arizona ready for deployment.”); GAO Still
Finding JSF Development Problems, 57 GC ¶ 117 (“According to
GAO…, (a) a major part of the airframe severed after about 9,000
hours of durability testing, and led to fracturing of another part;
(b) an engine caught fire during takeoff…; and (c) the program
experienced about 90-percent growth in mission system software
test points for the year, twice the 45-percent allowance for 2014
under the test plan.”), see also GAO-15-364.
•

The Wright brothers experience was consistent with modern
empirical research that suggests that breakthrough solutions are
most likely to come from perspectives outside the scientific
discipline of the problem at issue. The Wright Brothers – neither of whom attended college – dabbled in printing, and did
quite well for themselves in the nascent bicycle industry, before
setting their sights on flight. The brothers appear to have been
grinders (or tireless workers), masters of observation (of birds),
exhaustive researchers and experimenters (relying, in large part,
on trial and error), and as organized as they were methodical (to
which McCullough attributes their consistent success in their
frequent patent litigation).

•

High profile contests and prizes featured prominently in the
early evolution of the aviation industry. It is difficult to avoid
comparing the early Michelin and Orteig prizes (the former
won by Wilber Wright in 1908; the latter captured in 1927 by
Charles Lindbergh in the Spirit of St. Louis) with the more
modern Xprize, the UK’s 300th-anniversary Longitude Prize,
and the burgeoning government initiative that underlies Challenge.gov. See also, generally, Steven L. Schooner & Nathaniel E.
Castellano, Eyes on the Prize, Head in the Sand: Filling the Due
Process Vacuum in Federally Administered Contests, 24 Federal
Circuit Bar Journal 391 (2015); Paul Gottlieb and Leonard Rawicz, Federal Inducement Prizes, 15-9 Briefing Papers 1 (August
2015) (“[I]nducement prizes have specific limitations and are
not effective for many technological problems[,] but if properly
designed may produce extraordinary results.”).

•

The Wright brothers understood – and fully accepted – the risks
of their work. For example, the brothers never flew together
and witnessed the deaths of many of their contemporaries and
competitors. Managing risk, rather than simply avoiding risk,
is critical in innovation.

E. DoD Continues Its Effort to Analyze Metrics. For the last two
years, these materials suggested that some of the most thought-provoking
reading was found in DoD’s nascent performance, outcome, or metrics,
initiative. AT&L Issues First Defense Acquisition System Performance
Report, 55 GC ¶ 214, available at http://bbp.dau.mil/doc/Report_on_the_
Performance_of_the_Def_Acq_System.pdf; AT&L Releases Second Annual
DOD Acquisition Assessment, 56 GC ¶ 208; Office of the Under Secretary
© 2016 Thomson Reuters

9-14

NOTES
of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Performance of the Defense Acquisition System: 2014 Annual Report, available at http://bbp.
dau.mil/docs/Performance-of-Defense-Acquisition-System-2014.pdf; and
now, AT&L’s Third DOD Acquisition Assessment Scrutinizes Subcontractor
Margins, Program Baselines, 57 GC ¶ 309. See also, 56 GC ¶ 208, 55 GC
¶ 214 (for discussion of the prior reports). As expected, the new report is
chock-full of intriguing observations and conclusions, including.
•

Consistent with the stated (but, arguably, suppressed) BBP 3.0
theme, discussed above, the report suggests that: “[I]n some
areas[, DoD] may not be pushing the state-of-the-art enough
in terms of technical performance. This endangers our military technical superiority. .... Simply delivering what was
initially required on cost and schedule can lead to failure in
achieving our evolving national security mission—the reason
defense acquisition exists in the first place…. The confluence
of a number of results appears to support concern that we may
be slowing our investment in technical advanced systems….

•

“Tight budgets may motivate overly optimistic baselines and
higher cost-related growth…. [Analysis shows] a very strong
correlation between high acquisition cost growth for programs
and tight budgetary environments (like the one at present)
during program baselining. ...[I]t should give us all pause that
acquisition unit cost growth on such programs is consistently
3-times higher (about 30 percent versus 10 percent) than that
for programs started when budgets are not as constrained.

•

Since 2001, first-tier subcontractors earned higher margins than their associated prime contractors on the same
program (at the median, about 2 percentage points higher in development and about 7 percentage points higher in production).
… [The differences] illustrate why the DoD has been working
… to motivate prime contractors to control subcontractor prices
and ensure that profitability is aligned with performance—especially in production where the difference in margins is large.
[DoD is] also concerned that higher subcontract margins may
be motivating companies to bid on fewer prime contracts and
thus reduce competition at that level. This information will be
used to inform contract negotiations.

•

Not all acquisition reform attempts have been beneficial.

We encourage the acquisition, oversight, budgeting, and planning communities to applaud and support DoD’s efforts. We also encourage DoD
to evolve past a fascination with our longstanding, generally unhelpful,
and popular-primarily-because-they’re-easy-to-measure metrics (price,
schedule, performance specifications) associated with the award – rather
than the outcome – of the contract. Specifically, increased attention to
quantifying more meaningful measures such as life cycle cost, bang for the
buck, value for money spent, and customer satisfaction obtained would be
a step in the right direction. Along those lines, a recent anecdote demonstrating that titles (or words) and metrics (what you measure) matters, see
Suspension And Debarment Programs Continue To Improve, ISDC Reports,
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57 GC ¶ 108 (“In fiscal year 2014, agencies improved their suspension and
debarment (S&D) programs, and the numbers of S&D actions continued to
increase, the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC)
has reported. … [Yet, t]he ISDC emphasized that the overall numbers of
S&D actions are not metrics of success.”)
F. Consolidation of the Industrial Base. As defense procurement
spending contracts (see above), DoD faces increasing pressure to work
with private industry to facilitate consolidation. Particularly to the extent
that DoD is increasingly loath to pay for excess capacity, consolidation
seems unavoidable. We’ve been through this before, and it’s a painful,
painstaking process. For now, however, DoD seems to have backed itself
into a corner. Defense Secretary Cautions Against Further Consolidation
Among Large Primes, 57 GC ¶ 314 (SecDef Ash Carter stated the desire “to
avoid excessive consolidation in the defense industry, to the point where
we [do] not have multiple vendors who could compete with one another on
many programs.” USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall added that: “With size comes
power, and the department’s experience with large defense contractors
is that they are not hesitant to use this power for corporate advantage.”)
G. Reducing Cost Drivers: A Tepid Start. Despite frustration with
the (perceived as excessive) overhead rates that contractors charge, DoD
remains largely powerless to reduce the panoply of “cost drivers” that, in
large part, derive from a never ending succession of Congressional mandates. Nonetheless, many observers were curious to see how the report
of the BBP-inspired initiative to address this issue. The initial results are
now available, and, despite the volume of the report, little progress was
obtained. See, generally, Mark Husband & David J. Nicholls, Eliminating
Requirements Imposed on Industry Where Costs Exceed Benefits (September
29, 2015), http://www.acq.osd.mil/fo/docs/Eliminating-RequirementsImposed-on-Industry-Study-Report-2015.pdf. For a timely anecdote on
this topic, see, for example, Navy Should Improve Berry Amendment, Buy
American Compliance, 57 GC ¶ 268 (“Officials omitted required clauses
or failed to assess compliance because they were unaware of the requirements, made administrative errors or used a faulty clause matrix.”).
DoD poignantly observed that: “Actions that are unnecessary or of
little value for acquisition directly add costs, introduce delays in delivering
capability, and bar innovative new entrants. Here, we examined several
specific instances of regulatory burdens or their implementation imposed
on industry in order to eliminate unnecessary or unproductive actions.”
That seemed rather promising. DoD, however, appears to have taken a
formalistic, rather than a pragmatic (or results-oriented) approach, and,
in doing so, defeated the purpose.
“Unnecessary” and “unproductive” are the key adjectives here.
Statute and regulation are not arbitrary but are designed
to serve a purpose. The Department of Defense manages a
huge taxpayer investment and must provide transparency for
oversight to assess efficiency, fairness of the acquisition system,
and compliance with broader national, social, and economic
objectives. Additionally, many regulations are a response to
previous acquisition failures and are intended to prevent
© 2016 Thomson Reuters
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recurrence. Attempts to save money by eliminating actions
without considering these impacts/benefits are necessarily
inappropriate. So, the central challenge of this work was to
identify activities which could be eliminated with no or
minimal impact on statutory or regulatory objectives.

We disagree and, rather, read that starting point as a prospective
capitulation. We think the question that needs to be asked is: whether
the costs associated with individual statutes and regulations are
worth it to the DoD customer? It’s time to go back to the drawing board.
Fortunately, DoD concedes that: “There are many areas where the details of implementation are creating unnecessary or unproductive work.”
Alas, “just as such burdens were not created in a single step, decreasing
them will also be an incremental, continuous improvement process.” Our
sense is that DoD will need to be far more aggressive the next time around
if it hopes to maintain the status quo – merely reducing burdens at a rate
similar to that which Congress adds them – let alone significantly reducing burdens that inject inefficiency into the procurement process, inflate
contractors’ overhead, erect barrier to entry against commercial firms and
new entrants, and frustrate the DoD customer.
VI. THINKING BROADLY: THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE,
THE BUDGET, AND GOOD DECISION-MAKING.
Early in 2015, the Professional Services Council released its biennial
2014 Acquisition Policy Survey. (As always, these targeted surveys are
not large enough to be statistically precise, but we have found them to
be informative, thoughtful, consistently on point, and, accordingly, well
received.) See also Acquisition Survey Points To Persisting Budget Instability, Workforce Skill Gaps, 57 GC ¶ 48. Like its predecessors, this report
makes a number of significant observations.
•

The skills of the acquisition workforce … continue to be a
primary concern. The overwhelming majority of respondents
continued to cite significant weaknesses in critical skills areas
including business acumen, negotiating skills, and conducting
complex information technology acquisitions. …[N]o respondent
ranked workforce business acumen as being excellent; and only
20 percent rated it as “good.” … [W]hile over two-thirds of respondents said they believe negotiating skills are important or
extremely important in acquisition, only a small fraction said
they believe their workforce has adequate negotiating skills….

•

[The acquisition workforce concerns are] exacerbated by the
now-evident generation gap[.] The expected retirement wave is
now underway and the anticipated “bathtub” (the gap between
senior leaders and the next layer down) is equally evident …
causing an increased rate of experience and knowledge loss.

•

[T]he budget [and lack of certainty about funding were again
identified as] the top barrier to optimal performance. ... Budget
instability restricts spending on training and the hiring of
needed resources. Not knowing programmatic funding levels
precludes effective tradeoff analyses and planning. Programs
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place an overemphasis on cost savings as opposed to programmatic outcomes as a principal goal of the acquisition process.
This then naturally translates into a similarly narrow oversight
perspective on cost elements, often at the expense of a more
holistic view which, when combined with an already punitive
oversight environment in which collaboration is not encouraged,
ultimately has a chilling effect on the process as a whole….
•

There appeared to be little agreement on the role of tradeoff
analyses or business case assessments to achieve innovation,
and similarly little connection to the type of acquisition strategy or vehicle employed. … [LPTA] continues to be an area of
substantial disconnect between the government acquisition
community and its industry partners. Anecdotally, and unconnected to this survey, there is evidence of growing concern
among agency “customers” about the mission and performance
impacts being felt by the over-use or misapplication of LPTA
strategies. [Bear in mind that the survey preceded the release
of the Kendall LPTA memorandum, discussed above.]

•

[Despite] the [acknowledged] need for oversight/compliance,…
the extent of activity in this area [remains] a significant burden.
… [Respondents] identified ongoing problems with burdensome oversight and compliance demands related to small
business goal achievement, IG audits (and, for defense agencies,
DCAA audits), GAO activity, and budget requirements. The sheer
volume of regular data calls, ill-defined data calls, and ad-hoc
data calls combine to weigh on an agency’s procurement office.
Additionally, auditors can lack functional knowledge of acquisitions, which distracts procurement staff as they educate the
auditors regarding acquisitions.

VII. A BLAST FROM THE PAST: CHARGE CARD
MANAGEMENT
While it’s not a surprise, it helps to be reminded that even the most basic
organization and oversight requires consistent attention and vigilance. GSA
Charge And Travel Card Program Risk Rises, 57 GC ¶ 313 (It’s nice to know
that, at a minimum, “GSA runs monthly queries of transactions for questionable terms – such as ‘casino,’ ‘movies’ or ‘adult.’”); IGs Find Varying Compliance
With Charge Card Usage Rules, 57 GC ¶ 254 (Among other things, the IG
found that, while “DHS has established internal controls for both purchase
and travel cards, … it has not ensured that its components follow departmental rules[.]” The IG also analyzed DHS purchase card transactions at
Starbucks, resulting in the startling conclusion that these transactions “may
give the appearance that cardholders are not seeking lower priced options
based on personal preference.”); Senate Committee, IGs Tackle Purchase Card
Abuse, 57 GC ¶ 210, www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2015/20150629-15-N-0171.
pdf, www.nsf.gov/oig/_ pdf/15-2-008-travel-card.pdf; DOD Travel Cards
Used At Casinos, Adult-Entertainment Establishments, 57 GC ¶ 163 (Over a
one-year period, “2,636 DOD travel cardholders had 4,437 transactions worth
$952,258 that were likely for personal use at casinos and 900 transactions
worth $96,576 by 646 cardholders at adult-entertainment establishments.”).
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